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EMERGENCE, FUNCTION, AND REALIZATION 
Umut Baysan 
“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or 
similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena 
involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level 
ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the 
special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, 
properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from 
different levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. 
However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences 
between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The 
purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences.  
Realizing a Function 
Realization, as an inter-level relation, is often thought to be tightly related to the notion of a 
function, and this is arguably due to the fact that the notion of realization was imported into the 
contemporary philosophy of mind literature with a defence of functionalism alongside the 
refutation of the view that mental properties (e.g. being in pain) are identical with physical 
properties (e.g. having C-fibre stimulation). It was suggested by Putnam (1967) that mental 
properties are multiply realizable by different physical properties in different organisms – such 
that it is possible for two organisms to instantiate the same mental property without having any 
physical properties in common – therefore, a given mental property cannot be identified with 
any particular physical property. After all, if it is possible to be in pain without having C-fibre 
stimulation, being in pain and having C-fibre stimulation cannot be identical. This argument 
has come to be known as “the multiple realizability argument”, and it is sometimes interpreted 
to support functionalism – the view that mental properties are functional properties. For those 
who hold this view, just as the very same functional property (e.g. being a vending machine) 
can be instantiated in different physical ways, a mental property can be instantiated in different 
physical ways – as long as it carries out its constitutive function, whatever that function might 
be. 
Because of the association of the multiple realizability argument with functionalism, the idea 
that some higher-level property M is realized by physical properties is often interpreted as an 
endorsement of functionalism about M – to the extent that one occasionally sees 
interchangeable uses of “functionalism” and “realizationism” (e.g. Polger & Shapiro, 2016). In 
line with this, there is a widely held view that for some lower-level property to realize some 
higher-level property is for the former to play the role that the latter is associated with, where 
the said role is understood causally or functionally. As Polger (2004) remarks, we do not need 
to have a definitive account of what a function is just for the purposes of explaining what 
realization is. Different philosophers will have different conceptions of what a function is, and 
for each conception, there may be a different putative realization relation that involves how a 
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function of that sort can be physically realized.1 For example, one might agree with the early 
functionalists about the mind that mental properties are computational properties (e.g. Putnam 
1967), and thereby think that how a mental property is brought about by the instantiation of 
some physical properties and relations in one’s brain is analogous to, or perhaps identical in 
type with, how the processes that are constitutive of the software of a computer are brought 
about by the physical processes in the computer’s hardware. Or one might think that having a 
function is a just matter of playing some causal role (i.e. having characteristic causes and 
effects), where the causal role in question needn’t be computational. Suppose that being a heart 
is individuated by the causal role of pumping blood in an organism’s circulatory system 
through blood vessels. Then, for a physical system, realizing the property of being a heart 
would be a matter of having the right sort of physical properties that can play the causal roles 
that contribute to the pumping of blood through blood vessels.  
More generally, like those who have defended the “role-playing” account of realization, one 
might understand functional realization along the following lines: 
Functional Realization (FR): A property P functionally realizes a property F if and only 
if, for some causal role R, (i) F is individuated by R, and (ii) P is a property that plays 
R.2 
In FR, we have three key elements: first, a property F to be realized; second, a causal/functional 
role R that individuates F; and third, a property that can play R. “Role playing” is really the 
right metaphor here. Let’s say, in a story, we have a character (e.g. Batman), a role that is 
associated with that character (e.g. throwing batarangs at criminals), and someone who plays 
the role (e.g. whoever plays the Batman-role in that particular Batman story). Just as, in some 
stories, Bruce Wayne plays the Batman-role (partly) by throwing batarangs at criminals, 
physical properties realize functional properties in virtue of playing the causal/functional roles 
that characterise the latter – if functionalism is true.3 If properties in some domain D are 
individuated by causal/functional roles and, as a matter of fact, such causal/functional roles are 
occupied by physical properties, then properties in D are functionally realized by physical 
properties.4  
                                                 
1 See Polger’s (2004) Chapters 3 and 4 for a discussion. 
2 See Melnyk (2003) for an account of realization along these lines.  
3 Here, I am assuming that ‘Batman’ is not a proper name, but refers to a vigilante via a role. 
4 The discussion above does not cover the difference between realizer functionalism and role 
functionalism (about some property P). Roughly, the difference between these two views is that the 
former identifies P with the property that occupies P’s causal/functional role, whereas the latter does 
not. So, a realizer functionalist about mental properties may identify mental properties with physical 
properties because physical properties occupy the causal/functional roles that individuate mental 
properties (see Lewis, 1994).  
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Even though not all theories of realization give a central role to functions in their formulations 
of the realization relation (see Baysan, 2015), in nearly all accounts of realization, there is an 
emphasis on the causal profiles of realized and realizer properties, and moreover in these 
theories, it is suggested that the causal powers of a realized property are fully accounted for in 
terms of the causal powers of its realizer properties. Such claims of fully-accounting-for come 
in two incompatible forms. First, there are those who agree with versions of Kim’s (1992) 
causal inheritance principle that if a higher-level property Q is instantiated in virtue of some 
lower-level property P, then all causal powers of Q are also causal powers of P (e.g. Wilson 
1999; Clapp 2001; Shoemaker 2001; Baysan 2016). Second, there are those who disagree with 
the causal inheritance principle but still hold that the causal powers of realized properties are 
conferred on their bearers in virtue of the causal powers of their realizers (e.g. Pereboom, 2002; 
Gillett, 2003). We will revisit the causal inheritance principle in the section ‘Realization and 
Causal Powers’ below.  
Realization, Emergence, and Physicalism 
There is a sense in which claims of emergence and claims of realization can overlap, in 
particular if emergence is understood as weak emergence. For example, an emergent property 
can be physically realized if it is a functional property in one sense and its function is performed 
by some physical property. In fact, Wilson (2015) uses the term “weak emergence” to refer to 
the relation that I call “realization” here. In Wilson’s use, weak emergence and strong 
emergence are incompatible relations: if a higher-level property Q is strongly emergent from a 
lower-level property P, then Q is not weakly emergent from P (and vice versa). The reason is 
that whereas weak emergence (i.e. physical realization) of Q entails non-reductive physicalism 
about Q, its strong emergence is incompatible with physicalism about it.5 (Here, non-reductive 
physicalism is to be understood as the conjunction of physicalism and the rejection of the 
identity of higher-level properties with the lower-level ones, due to multiple realizability.) So, 
the main difference is this: whereas realization is a relation that relates higher-level properties 
to physical properties only if non-reductive physicalism is true, the existence of strongly 
emergent higher-level properties is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism.6  
If these observations are correct, then we can explain the differences between the relations of 
realization and strong emergence (henceforth simply emergence) by tracing the differences 
                                                 
5 In some usages, “weak emergence” and “strong emergence” do not refer to incompatible relations. 
For example, Chalmers (2006) takes strong emergence of x to be a matter of strict unexplainability of x 
(i.e. unexplainability, even in principle), and weak emergence of x to be a matter of non-strict 
unexplainability of x (i.e. unexplainability due to technical or practical difficulties). Assuming that 
something’s strict unexplainability entails, but is not entailed by, its unexplainability in practice, in 
Chalmers’s usages, the relations picked out by these two terms are not incompatible. 
6 It is important to note that strong emergence simpliciter does not falsify physicalism simpliciter. If 
there are strongly emergent phenomena within physics (e.g. quantum entanglement), we should not be 
expected to be non-physicalists about physics! But if higher-level properties turned out to be strongly 
emergent, then physicalism about such higher-level properties should be falsified. 
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between the commitments of (non-reductive) physicalist views about higher-level properties 
and anti-physicalist views about them. These are:  
(1) Physicalists who put forward realization claims hold that higher-level properties are 
“nothing over and above” physical properties. Their (anti-physicalist) emergentist 
counterparts – those who put forward emergence claims – hold that some higher-level 
properties are “over and above” physical properties. 
(2) Physicalists take only physical properties to be fundamental, hence hold that realized 
properties are non-fundamental. Emergentists attribute fundamentality to some higher-
level properties.  
(3) Physicalists hold that the distribution of higher-level properties (i.e. physically realized 
properties) supervenes on the distribution of physical properties with metaphysical 
necessity. Emergentists typically reject this metaphysical supervenience claim.  
(4) Physicalists typically hold that the causal powers of higher-level properties are fully 
accounted for in terms of the causal powers of their base properties. Emergentists reject 
this fully-accounting-for claim. 
As we shall see, these four differences between non-reductive physicalism and emergentism 
will point us towards four differences between the relations of realization and emergence.  
Over-and-aboveness 
Physicalism about higher-level properties (e.g. mental propreties) is typically understood as the 
view that they are “nothing over and above” physical properties (Smart, 1959). This way of 
formulating physicalism might have a reductive flavour, but there are reasons to think that all 
physicalists about the mind, reductive or non-reductive, should endorse the nothing-over-and-
aboveness of the mental vis-à-vis the physical. The following analogy might illuminate the 
possibility of nothing-over-and-aboveness without identity: suppose that (mereological) 
composition is ontologically innocent, but that composition is not identity; under this 
supposition, there are instances of nothing-over-and-aboveness without identity: a whole 
would be nothing over and above its parts yet it would not be identical with them.  
Assuming then that non-reductive physicalists will take realized properties to be nothing over 
and above their realizers, we can propose the following necessary condition on realization: 
Realization-OA (ROA): A property P realizes a property Q only if Q is nothing over 
and above P. 
Whatever the other features of the realization relation might be, if ROA is true, then it will 
never be the case that a property realizes another one whereby the latter is something over and 
above the former. And this is something we cannot say for the relationship between emergent 
properties and their bases. So, in this sense, emergent properties are not realized by their 
physical bases. For emergence, the following seems to be the case: 
Emergence-OA (EOA): A property Q is emergent from a property P only if Q is over 
and above P. 
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Again, the analogy from composition can be illustrative. Emergence is sometimes presented as 
the failure of exactly the aforementioned claim about the ontological innocence of composition: 
an emergent whole is supposed to be more than the sum of its parts. (More precisely, a whole 
with emergent properties is more than the sum of its parts.) So, it is reasonable to think that the 
emergent properties of a whole are not merely “resultant” properties of the properties of the 
parts of the whole. 
Admittedly the “over and above” talk is somewhat metaphorical, but some have filled in the 
metaphor in interesting ways, one of which we will cover in the section entitled ‘Realization 
and Causal Powers’ below.  
Fundamentality 
Let us now see how we can use the fundamentality criterion to highlight another difference 
between the realization and emergence relations. Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental 
properties are non-fundamental properties. So, a non-reductive physicalist, unlike her 
eliminativist counterparts, does not eliminate mental properties from her ontology; but unlike 
her reductive physicalist counterparts, she does not identify mental properties with broadly 
physical properties, which are supposed to be relatively fundamental properties.  
This point about fundamentality is helpful in making a progress about a well-known problem 
about the formulation of physicalism. The problem is the difficulty of responding to the 
following dilemma: if we formulate physicalism with reference to current physics, physicalism 
will be false (because current physics is not complete); if we formulate physicalism with 
reference to an ideal future physics, we will not know what physicalism is (because we do not 
know what future physics will be like). One way to get around this problem is to restrict the 
formulation of non-reductive physicalism to certain domains of higher-level properties and 
then propose that physicalism about that domain of properties is the view that those properties 
are real but not fundamental properties, whereas physical properties – whatever they might turn 
out to be like – are fundamental properties.7 Now, in order to capture the physicalist idea that 
higher-level properties are dependent on physical properties, a non-reductive physicalist should 
also hold that these non-fundamental higher-level properties are instantiated in virtue of the 
instantiations of some fundamental (physical) properties. Given that realization is supposed to 
be the relation that relates these non-fundamental properties to their fundamental (physical) 
bases, we have the following observation: 
Realization-F (RF): A property P realizes a property Q only if P is more fundamental 
than Q.8 
                                                 
7 Relatedly, see Wilson (2009) for a characterisation of “physical” that involves a “not fundamentally 
mental” clause. 
8 See Bennett (2011) for the view that such asymmetry of fundamentality should be the case in all in-
virtue-of relations. I am not committed to this stronger claim, and in fact I think the (possible) cases of 
emergence are counterexamples to it. 
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Note that RF is not committed to there being multiple degrees or levels of fundamentality. If 
there is only one level of fundamentality such that anything is either strictly fundamental or 
just non-fundamental, there can still be instances of RF: realizer properties could be strictly 
fundamental and realized properties could be just non-fundamental. 
Now, given that emergentists hold that some higher-level entities are fundamental despite being 
dependent on lower-level physical entities, then the following is a plausible conditional: 
Emergence-F (EF): A property Q is emergent from a property P only if Q is at least as 
fundamental as P. 
EF entertains the controversial idea that there could be dependent-yet-fundamental entities. 
Could there be such entities? There are ways of thinking about such possibility. One example 
is the early emergentists’ thought that some higher-level causal powers are fundamental 
(Broad, 1925; McLaughlin 1992). Surely, in suggesting that some higher-level causal powers 
are fundamental, early emergentists were not committed to such causal powers being 
ontologically independent. Also, Barnes (2012) surveys a number of metaphysical views in 
which some entities are both fundamental and dependent; for example, some philosophers think 
that persons are fundamental entities but are dependent on the parts of their physical bodies.  
The fundamentality criterion to distinguish between realization and emergence is also helpful 
in resolving a problem that comes up in the realization literature: the problem of conjunctive 
realizers. RF helps us see why conjunctive properties – if there are any – are not realizers of 
their conjuncts (as is widely accepted).9 For example, the conjunctive property of being red 
and spherical is not a realizer of being red. Intuitively, this is because although the 
(conjunctive) property of being red and spherical necessitates being red, the former does not 
bring about the latter. The problem of conjunctive realizers is the difficulty of getting this result 
without stipulating from the outset that no conjunctive property realizes any conjuncts. Now, 
note that RF already has the resources to get this result. Conjunctive properties – if there are 
any – are typically less fundamental than their conjuncts, as they are constructions out of their 
conjuncts. So a conjunctive property and its conjuncts typically will not satisfy RF. So, 
although it might strike some as a truism that realization relates fundamental properties to non-
fundamental properties and that emergence does not, there are interesting consequences one 
can discover by exploring the implications of this suggestion.  
Supervenience 
Many have thought that there is a difference between realization and emergence because non-
reductive physicalism is committed to the metaphysical supervenience of (realized) higher-
level properties on the physical ones, whereas emergentists reject this metaphysical 
supervenience claim and are committed to only the nomological supervenience of the higher-
level on the physical. Among others, van Cleve (1990), McLaughlin (1997), Noordhof (2003) 
                                                 
9 See Yablo (1992, p. 253), Shoemaker (2007, p. 23), Wilson (2009, p. 152). 
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and (arguably) Chalmers (1996; 2006) are those who have endorsed this difference between 
non-reductive physicalism and emergentism. So, for realization, the following seems to be true: 
Realization-S (RS): A property P realizes a property Q only if P metaphysically 
necessitates Q. 
And for emergence, the following: 
Emergence-S (ES): A property Q is emergent from a property P only if Q is 
nomologically, but not metaphysically, necessitated by P. 
Let me offer two important clarifications at this point. The first clarification is that, in RS, 
realizer properties must involve background conditions in order to enable metaphysical 
necessitation of the realized property by the realizer (Shoemaker, 1981), where such 
background conditions may include even the laws of physics (but not inter-level laws, if there 
are any).10 If a higher-level property is not metaphysically necessitated by some physical 
property that includes such rich background conditions, then it cannot be realized by that 
physical property. Suppose that a phenomenal property M is a higher-level property of this sort. 
What might guarantee the instantiation of M if such an enriched physical base may not? In 
addition to the laws of physics, we may have to include “trans-ordinal” (Broad, 1925) or 
psychophysical laws (Chalmers, 1996) in the background conditions of the base property, in 
which case we cannot be physicalists about M. And this brings us to the second clarification: 
the reason why ES requires no more than nomological necessitation is that unless other laws 
of nature (including the trans-ordinal or psychophysical laws) are included in the base, the 
instantiation of the base does not guarantee, in the metaphysical sense, the instantiation of an 
emergent property. That is, P and the background conditions alone can only nomologically 
necessitate M. But P, the background conditions, and all the laws of nature (or a proper subset 
of them that include the inter-level laws), together, metaphysically necessitate M. 
This criterion is controversial, however. This way of explaining the difference between 
realization and emergence (and likewise non-reductive physicalism and emergentism) is 
committed to there being a distinction between nomological and metaphysical necessity, and 
such a distinction is sometimes rejected for reasons that do not primarily concern us here (see 
Shoemaker 1998). But because of this, some may think that RS and ES are not successful in 
highlighting the difference between realization and emergence.11 
Realization and Causal Powers 
So far we have covered three putative ways of explaining the difference between realization 
and emergence: over-and-aboveness, fundamentality, and supervenience. Now, we will revisit 
                                                 
10 If the laws of physics are metaphysically necessary, then they do not need to be included in the 
background conditions. Also, if there are inter-level laws, physicalism suggests that they are derivable 
from the laws of physics. 
11 See O’Connor (1994) and Wilson (2005) for such criticisms.  
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Kim’s (1992) causal inheritance principle introduced above and explore whether we can use it 
to provide a fourth one.  
Recall that the causal inheritance principle suggests that higher-level properties inherit their 
causal powers from the lower-level base properties they depend on. As Wilson (1999) suggests, 
there is a connection between the causal inheritance principle and the nothing-over-and-
aboveness claims we discussed in the section titled ‘Over-and-aboveness’. She argues that 
[p]hysicalists [about mental properties] … cannot ...  allow that mental properties 
have any causal powers that are different from those of their physicalistically 
acceptable base properties, for this violates the physicalist thesis that mental 
properties are “nothing over and above” their base properties” (ibid., p. 41). 
Here, the idea is that we can understand the over-and-aboveness of a higher-level property in 
terms of the novelty of the causal powers it confers on its bearers, and thereby understand the 
failure of over-and-aboveness as the failure of such causal novelty. Then, it must be the case 
that whereas realized properties inherit all of their causal powers from their base properties, 
emergent properties do not; the latter must have novel causal powers, and the former must not. 
So, for realization we should say the following: 
Realization-CP (RCP): A property P realizes a property Q only if every causal power 
of Q is also a causal power of P. 
And for emergence, the following: 
Emergence-CP (ECP): A property Q is emergent from a property P only if some causal 
power of Q is not also a causal power of P. 
Wilson (2015) argues that these two conditionals are true and any other putative distinction 
between realization and emergence is either entailed by these two conditionals or inadequate 
to do the job.12 Note that even if one were to agree with Wilson that these two conditionals are 
true, one might still reject the further claim that other criteria are either redundant or inadequate.  
There is plenty of literature to back up ECP as a conditional, as emergentists are 
characteristically committed to there being novel causal powers that are associated with some 
higher-level properties (e.g. Broad, 1925; O’Connor, 1994; Crane, 2001), unless they want to 
take emergent properties to be epiphenomenal. But RCP is more controversial, and that is what 
we shall look at more closely. 
                                                 
12 I should remind the reader that, in Wilson’s terminology, this distinction is between “weak 
emergence” and “strong emergence”. 
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What might be the reasons to think that RCP is true? There are numerous arguments in favour 
of RCP, but for reasons of space, here I shall focus on only one of these arguments.13 Consider 
the following two principles: 
(A) A property P has a causal power C if and only if, as a matter of nomological 
necessity, all bearers of P have C. 
(B) If a property P realizes a property Q, as a matter of (at least) nomological necessity, 
all bearers of P are also bearers of Q. 
Suppose that having C-fibre stimulation in a suitably functioning nervous system (C-fs, for 
short) realizes being in pain (pain for short) and that cp1 is a causal power of being in pain. 
(Exactly what cp1 is does not matter for the purposes of this argument.) If (A) is true, it will be 
a matter of nomological necessity that all bearers of pain have cp1. Note that this does not mean 
that all bearers of pain must manifest cp1, as it is shared wisdom that causal powers may exist 
unmanifested. And if (B) is true, it will be a matter of (at least) nomological necessity that all 
bearers of C-fs are also bearers of pain. From these two observations, it follows that it is a 
matter of nomological necessity that all bearers of C-fs have cp1. This last observation and (A) 
entail that cp1 is a causal power of C-fs. Note that what is true of cp1 must be true for all causal 
powers of pain. So, any causal power pain is a causal power of C-fs. More generally, any causal 
power that we can attribute to a realized property must also be attributed to its realizer, which 
suggests that RCP is true. 
Is this argument persuasive? The argument makes use of two principles: (A) and (B). The 
second of these is not controversial, and it is entailed by RS discussed above. However, the 
principle stated in (A) is controversial, and admittedly the argument’s success hinges on it.14 
Nevertheless, the argument shows that explaining the relationship between properties and the 
causal powers they confer on their bearers is important for defending RCP and hence 
understanding the realization relation.15 
RCP has received much criticism, but due to space considerations, I have handpicked three 
objections. The first one is from Noordhof (1997; 2013),16 and it suggests that a realized 
property may confer different causal powers on its bearers depending on how it is realized. 
Pains realized in human beings and pains realized in robots may cause different pain 
                                                 
13 See Wilson (1999; 2011), Clapp (2001), Shoemaker (2001; 2007), and Baysan (2016) for arguments 
for RCP. The one we shall look at now is from Baysan (2016). 
14 This principle is defended in Baysan (2018). 
15 An interesting consequence of this argument is that it appears to apply to strong emergence too, if 
strong emergence is to be understood simply as a same-subject nomological necessitation relation. If 
true, that would be bad news for emergentists as it would be impossible for emergent properties to have 
novel causal powers. However, emergentists have resources to deal with this problem. See Baysan & 
Wilson (2017) for a number of ways out of this problem. 
16 Noordhof’s (1997) objection is actually against Kim’s causal inheritance principle, but in (2013) he 
presents it as an objection against Shoemaker (2007). 
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behaviours. So, the causal powers of a realized property outstrip the causal powers of its 
individual realizers. Hence, RCP is false.  
The second objection is from Pereboom (2002) and is based on the assumption that there is a 
constitution relation between the causal powers of a realized property and the causal powers of 
its realizers. Assuming that constitution is not identity, Pereboom argues, a causal power of a 
realized property cannot be identical with any of the causal powers of its realizers. So, RCP 
must be false.  
The third objection is from Gillett (2003), who motivates his objection by giving the following 
example: imagine a hard diamond which has the causal power to cut glass. In this diamond, 
hardness is realized by the properties (and relations) of the small bits that constitute the 
diamond. Although the causal power to cut glass is conferred on the diamond by hardness, no 
realizer property (i.e. properties of the small bits of the diamond) can confer this power on the 
diamond as those bits are too small to cut glass! Therefore, RCP should be rejected.  
What can the proponents of RCP say in response to these objections? Regarding the first 
objection, they could reject Noordhof’s claim that realizer-dependent causal powers are causal 
powers of realized properties; instead, such causal powers can be naturally said to belong to 
the realizer properties. Against the second objection, they could say that Pereboom is 
explaining a different relation: realization of causal powers by (other) causal powers, not 
realization of properties by (other) properties. Against the third objection, they could point out 
that they take realization to be a relation between properties of the very same object – not 
properties of a whole and the properties of its parts as Gillett does.17  
Nevertheless, responding to an objection is one thing, persuading one’s opponent is another; 
whether these responses will be persuasive remains to be seen. 
Conclusion 
Realization and emergence are two inter-level relations that have been invoked by some 
philosophers of mind and the special sciences to explain the dependence of higher-level 
properties on the lower-level ones. It is often suggested that higher-level properties are realized 
by, and/or emergent from, lower-level properties. Despite the similarity of realization and 
emergence claims, there are important differences between these two relations, in particular if 
emergence is understood as strong emergence. After briefly focusing on a functional theory of 
realization, I offered four different (but partially overlapping) ways of explaining the 
differences between these two relations. These differences are due to the fact that whereas 
realization claims are made as part of physicalist frameworks about higher-level properties, 
emergence claims are made as part of anti-physicalist frameworks.  
                                                 
17 I should note that Gillett foresees such a response, and thinks that a scientifically interesting 
realization relation should not be a same-subject necessitation relation, but should trace part-whole 
relations. 
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